Introduction
In the past, the Walter van Gerven Lectures have focused more on the institutional side of European integration than on the influence of European institutional law on substantive law, such as private law. Although the first lecture, delivered by Christiaan Timmermans, dealt with company law as Ius Commune, Bruno De Witte examined the national constitutional dimension of European treaty revision, Deirdre Curtin discussed the gap between the evolving EU executive and the Constitution, Gráinne De Búrca analysed the EU Constitution from the perspective of a search for Europe's international identity and, last year, Piet Eeckhout examined law and policy in the EU's external relations in the light of the European Constitution. Of course, no one will deny that a thorough analysis of the institutional side of European integration is highly important in order to understand the integration process. It should, however, not be forgotten that the institutions of the European Union and the European Community have been created with a particular purpose and aim in mind. I refer to Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, which states that the "Union shall set itself the following objectives" and then mentions as the first objective
"to promote economic and social progress and a high level of employment and to achieve balanced and sustainable development, in particular through the creation of an area without internal frontiers, through the strengthening of economic and social cohesion and through the establishment of economic and monetary union, ultimately including a single currency in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty".
I also refer to Article 2 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, which states:
"The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an economic and monetary union and by implementing common policies or activities referred to in Articles 3 and 4, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities, a high level of employment and of social protection, equality between men and women, sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic performance, a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States."
In Article 3 a list of specific activities is given, such as, under (1) (a):
"the prohibition, as between Member States, of customs duties and quantitative restrictions on the import and export of goods, and of all other measures having equivalent effect"
and under (1) (c):
"an internal market characterised by the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital."
Article 4 makes clear that the European Community is built upon the principle of an open market economy with free competition. In other words: one of the primary aims of both the European Union and the European Community is the promotion of economic prosperity.
1 Of course, the European integration process is not limited to economic activities, but the desire to create a common and internal market is still a significant driving force. The treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the Economic Community create a framework for the promotion of economic activities, which German literature has called a Wirtschaftsverfassung or economic constitution. This economic constitution consists of the fundamental rights, vital to the establishment and preservation of an open market economy with free competition. As such, the economic constitution functions as the interface between the economic parameters, the rule of law, the demands of a democratic and social society as well as the protection of fundamental human rights. Without private ownership a free market economy based upon free competition is not possible. The fundamental right to private ownership plays, therefore, a dominant role in the European economic constitution.
In this Walter van Gerven lecture I will focus on the role of property law in European integration. To understand the importance of property law I will first examine the European economic constitution more in detail (2). I will then discuss existing and future European property law, with a particular emphasis on the Common Frame of Reference (CFR) (3). Subsequently, I will examine which approach towards harmonisation of property law would be more effective: a top-down approach, meaning that at a European level codes of conduct, recommendations, directives or regulations are formulated (4) or a bottom-up approach, signifying that any harmonisation attempt should start with a search for common leading principles and ground rules to establish the fonds commun upon which the new European common (property) law can be built (5). 2 Finally, I will discuss the question how any new European property law may be received in the property law systems of the Member States: will osmosis between European and national law come into existence or will growing antagonism be the result? (6) 
The European economic constitution and property law
The idea of a so-called "economic constitution" has in particular been developed by German authors. 3 The economic constitution comprises the essential elements of a legal system from the perspective of the chosen economic model. The relevance of such a choice became very apparent during the transition stage that countries in Central and Eastern Europe had to go through as the result of the collapse of communism. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe needed a radical change of economic model within a very short period to avoid further impoverishment. This meant a change from a planned economy to a market economy and acceptance of freedom of private ownership, freedom of contract and freedom of profession and enterprise. All of these freedoms were absent under the previously existing economic model. If ever it becomes clear what the importance of an economic constitution is, it can be seen when studying the transition process in Central and Eastern Europe. What might seem self-evident for a lawyer coming from Western Europe is seen as the result of fundamental social, economic, political and legal change by lawyers from Central and Eastern Europe. During the era of communism, the economic constitution in these countries was based upon Marxism. The "means of production" were in the hands of the state, private ownership was only allowed to a very limited degree (e.g. with regard to goods for consumption). Production of goods and services was based upon central planning in accordance with multiyear plans performed by state enterprises. Freedom of contract hardly existed as contracts were seen as instruments to reach the goals set in the central economic plan. All of this had to be turned around after the fall of communism, which meant that the economic legal institutional framework had to be changed radically. A more striking example of the importance of the economic constitution underlying a legal system can hardly be provided.
The economic constitution can be defined as the ideological basis for the development of a legal system from the perspective of the chosen economic model. According to the German author Badura the definition for Wirtschaftsverfassung can be formulated as the Article 295 EC thus guarantees non-interference with national property law. As will be seen later, the ambit of this article is however far more restricted than one would be inclined to infer at first sight. Secondly, ownership is protected by The protection given by Article 1 of the First Protocol is very broad, due to the extensive interpretation of "possessions".
7 This article protects both the subjective right to ownership as well as the institution of ownership. 8 Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the corresponding Article II-77 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe reaffirm the protection of ownership at an EU level. 9 I will call this guarantee the "freedom of ownership".
The third element of the economic constitution is the freedom of contract and the freedom for entrepreneurs to take their own (market) decisions. This is an expression of the more general freedom of every person to make its own choices. All these freedoms are, of course, not without limits, but they function as sign posts with regard to the economic structure underlying property law.
Restating the above it can be said with certainty that "freedom of ownership" is one of the pillars of the economic constitution of the European Union and the European Community. However, this freedom is not unlimited. It is a freedom bound by the economic integration process and the aim to reach a common and internal market. Diverging national rules on property law may prove to be such an obstacle to this process that harmonisation or even unification of these rules might have to be considered. 10 Until recently, such consideration was seen as rather useless in the light of the existing divergence between the property law traditions in Europe. Especially the differences between common law and civil law were seen as almost unbridgeable. Under the pressure of economic integration, however, harmonisation of property law is more and more considered to be unavoidable. Integration of capital markets, to give but one illustration, will not be completely possible if the legal instruments used by, for instance, banks to secure repayment of a loan still differ from country to country. Let me give an example. A German bank, when lending money to a Belgian client to buy a house in Spain, may demand from her Belgian customer a (second) mortgage on the client's house in Belgium and a first mortgage on the house in Spain. For the German bank this means that legal advice is needed in Belgium and Spain, as under generally accepted rules of private international law (lex rei sitae) Belgian law will govern the mortgage in Belgium and Spanish law will govern the mortgage in Spain. The German bank will lack sufficient knowledge of Belgian and Spanish mortgage law and will therefore request advice from local experts, such as notaries. As a consequence transaction costs will rise. Eliminating these legal divergences through a harmonisation of mortgage law, would reduce transaction costs and thus be favourable for banks and their clients. At the moment, these transaction costs are an obstacle to a fully integrated mortgage market.
Existing and future European property law (a) Primary European law
It is debated in legal literature whether primary European law, has a direct impact on property law. The following articles of the EC Treaty are often mentioned: Articles 28 and 29 EC, declaring that quantitative restrictions on imports or exports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States, and Article 56 EC, stating that within the framework of the provisions set out in chapter 4 on capital and payments, all restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited. If property law is to be affected by Article 28 EC, it will have to be argued that property rights are products, which can be exported and imported. So far, the European Court of Justice has not gone in that direction.
11 With regard to Article 56 EC, however, 16 Finally, a directive must be mentioned that had a direct impact on the property law systems of the Member States: the Financial Collateral Directive (2002/47/EC). 17 The latter directive's aim is to harmonise the law on financial collateral arrangements, meaning a title transfer financial collateral arrangement or a security financial collateral arrangement. A title transfer financial collateral arrangement is an arrangement, including repurchase agreements, under which a collateral provider transfers full ownership of financial collateral to a collateral taker for the purpose of securing or otherwise covering the performance of relevant financial obligations. A security financial collateral arrangement is an arrangement under which a collateral provider provides financial collateral by way of security in favour of, or to, a collateral taker, and where the full ownership of the financial collateral remains with the collateral provider when the security right is established. It will be apparent from the above that the various European legislative measures in the area of property law are not part of a coherent structure and show a fragmented approach, as can be seen in other areas of European private law.
(c) Future secondary European property law As to future secondary European property law the picture is almost as fragmented as we saw concerning already existing European property law. Several Directorates General are working on various projects concerning harmonisation of property law.
The Directorate General Internal Market and Services is preparing the introduction of a new uniform type of a non-accessory (i.e. not dependent upon the existence of an underlying debt) European mortgage on immovables, essentially based upon German and Swiss mortgage law. 18 In this area already some acquis communautaire exists: a code of conduct, which covers consumer information for domestic and cross-border home loans. The purpose of this code is to guarantee that consumers receive transparent and comparable information on housing loans in order to encourage cross-border competition.
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Connected with the attempt to harmonise mortgage law are the attempts to provide better cross-border access to information contained in land registries. Reference can be made to the EULIS (European Land Information Service) project, which, according to the Commission's Green Paper on Mortgage Credit in the EU, was funded by the European Commission and is now to be continued. 20 EULIS will provide access to core information in land registries for each participating country. The information includes a basic description of legal concepts, a description of routines and effects of registration of real property conveyance and mortgaging, as well as contact information concerning authorities involved in real property transactions. Access to real property data is provided on the basis of property-id (cadastral unit) or address of the property. Headers in the register output will be presented in English. The land information is presented in the national language.
Under the responsibility of the Directorate Health and Consumer Protection the time-share directive undergoes a process of review. 21 Although the present directive only affects the contractual aspects of time-share arrangements, the concept of a time-share without any doubt belongs to property law: it leads to a fragmentation of ownership by splitting up ownership rights into being the "owner" for a limited, periodically returning, period. It will be quite interesting to see, whether property law aspects of time-share arrangements will be considered in the revision process.
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It should further be mentioned that the Committee on Legal Affairs of the European Parliament has appointed three experts, who had to prepare a hearing on the concept of the trust in common law jurisdictions as part of the consultative process regarding the Green Paper on Wills and Succession. 23 In this green paper a broad-based consultation process is opened on intestate and testate succession with an international dimension. Although the green paper mainly deals with private international law, it has raised questions with regard to recognition of common law trusts in civil law jurisdictions. The common law trust is characterised by fragmented ownership: both the trustee/manager and the beneficiary are owner of the trust property, but each has its own ownership rights. The trustee owns the property to manage it. The beneficiary owns the property with regard to the benefits. The trust mechanism is frequently used in common law jurisdictions to divide an estate between, to give but one example, a surviving spouse and the children. Such a fragmented ownership is difficult to reconcile with the traditional civil law approach, which only accepts unitary ownership. The recognition of a common law trust in a civil law system therefore requires a certain amount of adaptation. A hearing was held on 3 May 2006. 24 In the final report on the green paper the European Parliament referred to Article 295 EC to make clear that trust law belongs to property law and hence does not fall under the competence of the European Community, but did point out that trust law might interfere with the law applicable to a succession.
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As far as I understand the Recommendation, this would mean that civil law jurisdictions still would have to recognise common law trusts, applying the law that is applicable to the trust. Recognition would, however, imply acceptance of fragmented ownership, also with regard to trust property situated in the respective civil law jurisdiction. It will be very interesting to watch the developments concerning the harmonisation of private international law in this area.
(d) The Common Frame of Reference as a "toolbox" for future European property law
One of the major attempts to streamline existing and future property law is the Common Frame of Reference (CFR), a project meant to restructure existing European private law and to be a "toolbox" for future European private law. This project falls under the responsibility of the Directorate General Health and Consumer Protection. Although the CFR's main focus is on contract law, a study conducted by von Bar and Drobnig shows that harmonisation of contract law inevitably must lead to harmonisation of certain parts of the law of property. 26 In France and Belgium, to give but one example, a sales agreement results in an immediate transfer of ownership. Both countries follow the so-called consensual transfer system. Such property consequences of a sales agreement cannot but influence the rules with regard to the formation of contracts.
The structure of the CFR, as originally proposed, includes assignment of claims, personal security rights, security rights in movables, transfer of title in movables, related matters in property law (it is as yet unclear what these matters might be); perhaps trusts could be added. At this moment a debate is going on as to whether these aspects of property law should still be included in the CFR. On 21 November 2006, the author attended a public hearing which had been convened by the Committee of Legal Affairs of the European Parliament. The hearing concerned the future of the CFR. It was stated by the Member of European Parliament Lehne that no decision had yet been taken by either the European Commission, the European Parliament or the Council of Ministers not to include property law in the CFR. 27 In my view, it may prove to be very difficult, not to say impossible, to exclude property law from the CFR, given the already existing law and the work on future European property law. The CFR would not give an adequate and full overview of even the consumer law acquis and it would not provide a tool box to facilitate law-making for the EU institutions, if it would not also include at least some aspects of property law as mentioned above. Fortunately, three members from the Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament have established a special working group on the CFR. I am convinced that the involvement of the European Parliament in this project will prove to be beneficial. A CFR, whatever its status (binding instrument, whether in an opt-in or an opt-out version, nonbinding instrument, interinstitutional agreement) is bound to have a profound and lasting impact on the development of European private law generally and also, more specifically, on European property law. For that reason alone the final result of such a project must have gone through a process of political decision making by a democratically elected legislative body.
A wholly different question is, whether an overall legislative project, such as the CFR, is the best approach towards the establishment of a common and internal market. It is a typical example of a top-down approach. At the European level choices are made as to which solutions are the "best" to be further developed as European private law. Why not take the opposite approach, advocated in the United States by Brandeis, J. in his dissent in New State Ice Co. v Liebmann that the states might act as laboratories to find out what might be the most efficient and most effective solution for other states? 28 In other words: why not accept competition between the various national legal systems? Would it not be far better for the acceptance of harmonised or unified rules if these were based upon a bottom-up approach instead of a top-down approach? Before answering these questions I would briefly like to discuss whether the European Community and the European Union have any competence to create a fully binding Common Frame of Reference in the area of property law. If not, a top-down approach would already fail merely on this ground.
Top-down harmonisation of property law: competence and policy
The question whether property law should be harmonised must be clearly distinguished from the question how this could be done: "top-down" or "bottom-up". The "top-down" approach means that the European Union and the European Community use the well-known legislative forms of a directive or a regulation to force Member States to change their national laws or, less compelling, use a non-binding recommendation. 29 Such a legislative measure, however, must find a basis in the European treaties. 30 A possible legal ground for harmonisation of property law might be Article 95 EC. In order to use Article 95 EC as a legal basis, the legislator must argue that the measure is necessary to attain the establishment and functioning of the internal market, but this should be more than an incantation. The ECJ has made this abundantly clear in its Tobacco judgment. 31 Article 95 EC does not vest in the Community legislature a general power to regulate the internal market. 32 Furthermore, Community action must not violate the subsidiarity principle as laid down in Article 5 EC, Article 2 TEU and Protocol 30 to the EC Treaty on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. According to Article 5 EC the Community shall take action in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. This overall limitation also applies to the form of the legislative measure to be chosen, as the form of community action "shall be as simple as possible". 33 To me it seems that Article 95 can only be the basis for harmonisation of certain specific areas of property law. It cannot be argued that the whole area of property law must be harmonised to achieve the objective of progressively establishing an internal market, as this would in fact mean that the European Community had a general power to regulate the internal market. The ECJ stated clearly in the Tobacco judgment that such a general power does not exist. Only sectoral, not general, top-down harmonisation will be possible.
Finally, also Article 295 EC should be taken into consideration. This article states, as we already saw, that the EC Treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership. Although at first sight it seems that Article 295 has a large ambit, its effect has been limited in case-law developed by the ECJ. Reference can be made to the so-called "Golden Shares" cases. 34 In these cases the Court had to decide on the compatibility with community law of "national systems which grant the executive certain prerogatives to intervene in the share structure and in the management of privatised enterprises in strategically important areas of the economy." 35 A wholly different matter is, whether property law should be harmonised in the first place. This is a question of legal policy. Is there really a need to harmonise? Looking at the existing European property law and the various projects going on, it seems to me that it can safely be said that harmonisation in areas which directly affect cross-border business dealings is perceived to be useful. Examples are security interests with regard to movables and claims as well as mortgages on immovables. The difficulty here is that harmonisation of these areas cannot be undertaken without looking also at the whole fabric of property law and the interaction between property law and the law of obligations, especially contract law. The creation of a security interest or the establishment of a mortgage is in several legal systems closely linked to the general rules on transfer of movables, claims and immovables. A new rule concerning the creation of, for instance, a security interest might thus upset general rules on transfer and risks to create tensions in the national property law system. To avoid that necessary harmonisation creates such tensions a top-down harmonisation should be prepared and accompanied by a bottom-up approach. Such a bottomup approach will pave the way towards well considered sectoral harmonisation of property law and might even lead to spontaneous, albeit more gradual, harmonisation.
The bottom-up approach: a search for thought patterns
Preparing a bottom-up approach requires intensive and thorough analysis of the various property law traditions in Europe. 38 Special and careful attention will have to be paid to the differences between common law and civil law. It will be necessary to investigate these traditions while looking under the surface of diverging technical rules of law. By using a historical-comparative analysis the differences between common and civil law can be better understood. The basic structure of a property law system (and this applies to both the common law as well as the civil law tradition) is frequently the combined result of historical developments, the needs of legal practice, case law and academic legal analysis. In spite of all the differences between the national property law systems, such historical-comparative "under the surface" analysis will show that it will certainly be possible to find common thought patterns. Once when these common thought patterns have been found, harmonisation measures should take these into account in order to avoid unnecessary friction in the national legal systems.
When looking for such common thought patterns a distinction should be made between leading principles, ground rules and technical rules. In my view leading principles of property law are the filters through which a legal relationship must pass, before it can be characterised as a property right. 39 These filters separate personal rights (such as contractual rights) from property rights (rights against the world with erga omnes effect) and focus on the external aspects -the effects towards third parties -of rights. Ground rules describe the consequences of a right after it has been established that it has the character of a property right. Finally, technical rules provide in more detail how property rights function and are more of a detailed nature (e.g. the requirement of a notarial deed in case of transfer of land). I will focus on the leading principles and the ground rules.
(a) Leading principles
The leading principles of property law are the principle of numerus clausus (i) and the principle of transparency (ii).
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(i) According to the numerus clausus principle the content and number of property rights is limited, given the effect of these rights vis-à-vis third parties. Property rights are "rights against the world" or, in other words, have erga omnes effect and give the holder of these rights far more power than for instance a right arising from a contract. As a consequence legal systems are careful not to accept property rights too easily and therefore limit their number and content. In some legal systems this limitation is stronger than in others, but it can be found in both common as well as civil law, although it has been more theoretically developed in civil law systems. An example from the common law is the limitation of estates at law in Section 1 of the English Law of Property Act 1925. A clear example of a legal system that, at least in theory, strictly adheres to the numerus clausus principle is German law. What can be seen, however, when further examining German law (and the same applies to French law) is that courts have accepted property rights outside the official legislative list. Examples under German law are the acceptance of Anwartschaftsrechte (expectation rights), the Treuhand (civil law trust) and the right arising as a result of a Vormerkung (preliminary registration of a deed relating to a land transaction). 41 The nature of these three rights is debated in German literature, but it cannot be denied that in all three cases the person having an Anwartschaftsrecht (e.g. the buyer under a retention of title sale), the Treugeber (e.g. someone depositing money in a trust account) and the buyer of land all have rights vis-à-vis third parties of such a nature and of such a strength that these rights can be qualified as property rights. Under French law the Cour de Cassation decided in an old case, that the definition of ownership in the French Civil Code is merely descriptif, but not prohibitif, meaning that parties have the freedom to fragment ownership and thus create new property rights. 42 I do realise that this case is fairly old, but it still is a classical case in French property law and it makes it better understandable why in France legislation that will introduce a civil law trust (fiducie) is again seriously considered. 43 (ii) The second principle I mentioned above is the principle of transparency. This principle has two aspects: given the nature and effect of property rights as rights against the world, others must be able to know about these rights, because of their binding nature. Information is therefore a vital aspect of a property right. It is interesting to see that, with regard to immovables and certain movables of high value, publication almost always means registration in a public register. This can be observed with regard to land, but also concerning ships and aircraft and in the future, but only limited, to security interests and mobile equipment such as railway rolling stock. 44 With regard to movables the information is given by possession, concerning claims frequently information on for instance a transfer must be given to the claim's debtor. Remarkably enough, the role of possession as information carrier is diminishing in the light of the enormous importance of possession transfers, which are effected by mutual agreement (such as transfer of possession by constitutum possessorium in a situation where the seller will remain in control of the movables after the transfer to the buyer). The role of possession is further diminishing as a consequence of the rise of non-possessory security interests, such as the non-possessory pledge in the Netherlands, the transfer of ownership for security purposes in Germany and the financial collateral arrangement under the European Financial Collateral Directive. Concerning claims, particularly in case of a bulk transfer or the creation of a bulk security interest, more and more legal systems do not require that information is given to the debtor of the claim. The requirement to inform all the debtors of a bulk transfer would make such a transaction highly expensive and the debtors may still pay their debt to the original creditor. This development is going so far that in German legal literature the question has been raised whether, on the one hand, land law and the law of high value movables and, on the other hand, the law of low value movables and claims should perhaps be treated as two separate legal areas. 45 For a common lawyer this might not seem to be such a drastic change, as in a common law system the law of property does not have a unified structure. Common lawyers still make a difference between land law, personal property law and trust law. For a civil lawyer this is very different. It was one of the great achievements of the civil law codifications after the French Revolution that the existing fragmentation was replaced by a system of property law with general principles and rules, which would apply to all forms of property: immovables, movables and claims. In fact, if such a distinction between objects with high value and objects with low value would be made in the civil law, this would bring common and civil law closer together at a more structural level.
The above brief analysis of the two leading principles of property law shows, first of all, that what was discussed are, indeed, principles and not rules, as they shed light on when a right can be qualified as a property right, without giving a decisive answer. Secondly, it shows that the criticism -often heard, but never really substantiated -by civil property lawyers that the common law of property is fragmented, unsystematic and therefore not a suitable model for a possible European property law needs to be reconsidered. The same is true of the criticism by common property lawyers that the civil law is far too theoreti-cal to be workable in practice. The above analysis shows that civil and common law, at least at the level of principles, show more common ground than might be thought at first sight.
(b) Ground rules
Once it has been established that a right can be fitted into the numerus clausus of property rights and is transparent enough towards third parties for it to be justified that these third parties are nolens volens bound by it, the ground rules of property law apply. These ground rules concern the further consequences of the conclusion that the right in question is a property right and focus on how property rights relate among themselves. In Europe, these ground rules are the following: the nemo dat (or nemo plus) rule (i), the prior tempore rule (ii), limited rights have priority over fuller rights (iii), protection rules such as the right to (re)claim the object of the property right (iv).
(i) According to the nemo dat rule, one cannot give away more than one has. A transfer of the right of ownership, to give an example, is only effective if the transferor has the power to dispose, because he or she is the owner. This is a highly logical ground rule. It would be unacceptable if one were able to alienate the property rights of others, which would violate the absolute nature of such a property right. Of course, the nemo dat rule is counterbalanced by rules on third party protection. A third party in good faith, who paid for the right, is frequently protected against the original owner, who claims his right of ownership. A major reason for such an exception can be that in day-to-day business a buyer should be allowed to rely, if justified, on the outward appearance that a seller is also the owner, to safeguard ordinary commercial dealings. If the original owner could always reclaim the right of ownership, this could jeopardize commerce and would affect various third parties in good faith.
(ii) If various persons claim property rights with regard to an object, the oldest property right has priority over a younger property right: prior tempore, potior iure. This ground rule is connected, first of all, with the absolute nature of the pre-existing property right. A property right can only be impaired by a new property right if the holder of the existing property right is a party to the creation of the new property right. If not, the absolute nature of the pre-existing property right protects the holder of such a property right against later property rights. This explains, for instance, why a mortgage which was created after another mortgage had already been created, ranks second and its holder will only be entitled to the proceeds of any public auction after the first mortgagee has been fully paid.
(iii) Nevertheless, if a new property right has been created with the consent of the holder of the first property right, such a second right will limit the first right. In such a case the first right holder (sometimes in civil law terminology called the holder of the "mother right") then must accept that the holder of the second property right has a stronger position and can enforce its right (the "daughter right") against the mother right, although the "daughter right" is younger than the "mother right". For that reason, a right of mortgage is stronger than the right of ownership which is burdened by the right of mortgage.
(iv) Finally, the fourth ground rule is that, once a property right has been accepted as such it is given special protection. This could be with a special remedy, such as revindication (the owner can claim the object of the right of ownership from any person who has such object under his control), or with the help of claims based upon tort. It could be contended that some circularity of reasoning may be detected here, because it could be argued that whenever a right is given special protection through for instance a revindication claim, such a right must be a property right. In my view this is incorrect. If a special claim is given to a right holder or if such right holder is given a protected status in insolvency proceedings, allowing him or her to separate the object of the right from the insolvent estate, this means that it must have been decided previously that the right to be protected is a property right.
European and national property law: osmosis or growing antagonism?
It should not be forgotten that the European Union and the European Community were created with a particular aim: the establishment of a common and internal market. The various institutions were, originally, set up with that particular aim in mind. To establish and preserve this common and internal market the European treaties provide a framework for economic activities: the European economic constitution. An essential part of this economic constitution is freedom of ownership. Freedom of ownership should be interpreted broadly and be seen as freedom of property rights, especially in the light of the case law developed by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.
The protection of ownership in the European economic constitution does not mean that rules of property law are immune to harmonisation, if such rules create an obstacle to the establishment of the common and internal market. In order to find out which areas of property law should be harmonised and what would be the best way to proceed two approaches have been examined: the top-down approach and the bottom-up approach. I hope to have shown that the bottom-up approach should precede the top-down approach.
A bottom-up approach makes it possible to discern what the various property law systems in Europe have in common. These common features are, as we have seen, of a fairly abstract nature and can be divided into leading principles, ground rules and technical rules. Underlying these principles and rules are policy choices, such as the protection of commerce above protection of the original owner. The diverging technical rules are the greatest difficulty here, as due to their technical complexity they sometimes make it very hard to understand what is happening in a particular legal system "under the surface". It is this last approach that is vital to tracking the common features. A major problem for such an in-depth analysis is the desire of property lawyers to adhere to chosen definitions to such a degree that they get trapped in their own legal constructions and need a more metajuridical view to escape from that trap. Historicalcomparative legal analysis offers such a metajuridical view. Essentially, property law is about rights that people claim with regard to objects. These objects can be things (Sachen), but also personal rights or ideas. The most extensive right a person can claim is "ownership" or "full entitlement". What constitutes "ownership" or "full entitlement" is a purely dogmatic question, based upon an a priori chosen definition. If the definition is limited to corporeal things (as in Germany and the Netherlands) you cannot "own" rights, but rights "belong" to you. Does it really matter? You can transfer rights, pledge them, create a right of usufruct on these rights. To me the whole debate on whether rights can be "owned" is a trap, created by pandectist legal thinking. We are the prisoners of definitions we have formulated ourselves. Some legal realism might be helpful here and to me legal realism in this area of the law means that what counts is the content of your right: if the content of "owning" or "belonging" is the same with regard to things and rights (and in my view it is: transferability, creation of a security right, usufruct), why make a -wholly unnecessary -distinction? Is not this what Ockham's razor -to put it briefly: that one should select the least complicated theory that presents an explanation -is all about? If European property law is founded upon the aforementioned common features (leading principles and ground rules), thus creating awareness of the various underlying common thought patterns, the result will be that European property law is not perceived as a corpus alienum, but as law that can be received and accepted as a further development of the existing national property law. The result will then be a growing osmosis between national and European property law.
However, a top-down approach, not based upon thorough research of the national property law traditions in the European Union, is bound to lead to growing antagonism between national and European property law. If the European rules are too much common law based, frictions with civil law systems will occur and vice versa. If the rules are too much the result of lobbying by a particular interest group different interest groups at a national level may consider these European measures as an unacceptable interference with national property law. During my work as an advisor in Central and Eastern Europe I once heard a representative from the banking industry say that if the national parliament in a particular country would not legislate as the banking industry wanted they would lobby for a solution at the European level to bypass that national parliament. It will not surprise any of you that, after such a threat, not only national politicians will start to revolt against Europe, but also other national interest groups as well as national lawyers working in this area. This is the top-down approach, which creates antagonism.
To me, therefore, the answer to the question what can be observed with regard to European and national property law -osmosis or growing antagonism -is that both can be seen. To promote osmosis and avoid growing antagonism it is submitted that a combined bottom-up / top-down approach will be a conditio sine qua non. Based upon a thorough analysis of the national legal systems, a European model could be developed that should have a non-binding nature and could act as an extra jurisdiction next to the legal systems of the Member States. The European model could then prove itself in competition with the existing national law. 46 In this way, it will become clear "bottom-up" how far -in the famous words of the late Lord Denning, M.R. in the case of Bulmer v Bollinger -the "incoming tide" of European law will come. 47 The expression "incoming tide" makes me think of the famous book Der Schimmelreiter by the well-known author (and lawyer!) Theodor Storm, published in May 1888 shortly before his death. One of the leading themes in the book is the immense fear of rising water and the urge to protect oneself against this by building and maintaining dykes. At some moment, the main character of the book, the dykemaster (Deichgraf ) Hauke Haien, rides on his horse with his little girl along the dykes and the following conversation ensues: 48 The rising water is for the child what to most national property lawyers is the incoming tide of European law. It creates fear and is sometimes even being denied. The dykemaster is the European private lawyer, who tries to analyse where the water should be free to go and where it should be stopped by building a solid dyke. A challenging task!
"Es war Hochflut; als sie auf den Deich hinauf kamen, schlug der Widerschein der Sonne von dem weiten Wasser ihr in die Augen

Notes
The hyperlinks mentioned in the notes have also been reproduced on the website of Leuven CCLE in order to allow fast navigation (www.ccle.eu). All URLs have been verified in November 2006. 27. Furthermore, the rules at issue may well cause the contracting parties to incur additional costs, by requiring them, purely for the purposes of registering the mortgage, to value the debt in the national currency and, as the case may be, formally to record that currency conversion.
28. In those circumstances, an obligation to have recourse to the national currency for the purposes of creating a mortgage must be regarded, in principle, as a restriction on the movement of capital within the meaning of Article 73b of the Treaty.
29. The Finnish Government submits, however, that the free movement of capital is not an absolute principle and that the national rules at issue in the main proceedings are designed to ensure the foreseeability and transparency of the mortgage system, which constitutes an overriding factor serving the public interest, and is such as to justify the rules in question.
30. It should be noted that a Member State is entitled to take the necessary measures to ensure that the mortgage system clearly and transparently prescribes the respective rights of mortgagees inter se, as well as the rights of mortgagees as a whole vis-à-vis other creditors. Since the mortgage system is governed by the law of the State in which the mortgaged property is located, it is the law of that State which determines the means by which the attainment of that objective is to be ensured.
31. Neither the Austrian Government nor the parties to the main proceedings have submitted observations to the Court. But even assuming that rules such as those in issue are in fact designed to attain that objective, it appears that those rules enable lower-ranking creditors to establish the precise amount of prior-ranking debts, and thus to assess the value of the security offered to them, only at the price of a lack of security for creditors whose debts are denominated in foreign currencies.
32. In addition, national rules such as those at issue in the main proceedings contain an element of uncertainty which may compromise the attainment of the objective described above. As stated in paragraph 5 of this judgment, the Austrian rules allow the value of the mortgage to be expressed by reference to the price of fine gold. Yet, as the Advocate General observes in point 14 of his Opinion, the price of gold is currently subject to fluctuations in the same way as the value of a foreign currency. "The European Parliament points out that the rules on property ownership come under the competence of the Member States, pursuant to Article 295 of the Treaty, and therefore requests that the legislative act to be adopted should not apply to trusts. However, that instrument should specify that when a trust is created as a result of death, the fact that the law specified by the instrument in question applies to the succession does not prevent another law from being applicable to management of the trust and that, by the same token, the fact that the law governing the trust applies to it should not prevent the law governing the succession by virtue of the future legislative act from being applicable to it." We may strike down the statute which embodies it on the ground that, in our opinion, the measure is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. We have power to do this, because the due process clause has been held by the Court applicable to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure. But, in the exercise of this high power, we must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal principles. If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold." (footnote omitted) 29 See Article 249 EC. The Leuven CCLE research method consists in bridging the classical dividing lines between legal disciplines and in engaging in comparative and cross-disciplinary legal research, while at the same time embedding legal scholarship in broader social, economic, cultural and political contexts. Studies will not only focus on private law, but also on public law and areas of the law situated at the boundaries of its classical branches.
The first and foremost goal of Leuven CCLE is to promote fundamental legal research on the interaction between the aforementioned different fields and methods, thereby thoroughly analysing bottom-up as well as top-down movements. This approach is necessary in order to determine to what extent the building bricks of national, European and international law can be used to promote a common legal construction for Europe.
Leuven CCLE approaches the law not as a rule set in stone, but as a living and dynamic process. The core of the process is the interaction between different legal orders in Europe: between Community and national law, between separate national legal systems and between European and international law. As the composite of legal rules grows ever more complex, the question of legitimacy of legal rules is perceived as a major subject of research.
The Leuven CCLE aproach to scholarship and research is rooted in the firm conviction, indicated by forty years of comparative analysis, that it will become more and more apparent that legal systems which prima facie may look very different are built around common principles that in Europe constitute a ius commune or a common law of Europe.
The Ius Commune Research School
The -To what extent can the principles of democracy and Rechtsstaat (constitutional state) serve as a guide in the process of transnational integration? It is tried to answer this question from both a public law perspective (democracy and Rechtsstaat (constitutional state) as foundations of a ius commune) and a private law perspective (the impact of human rights on private law).
